This paper analyzes the causes, effects and policy alternatives associated with the recent international food price crisis in the Andean region. Additionally, the document makes a first approach to the policy options utilized to confront the crisis, discussing the mix of policies and their potential effectiveness, using a qualitative methodology based in part on schemes proposed in Manzano and Stein (2008), and Malarín (2008) . A final section underscores various messages common to the countries of the region. Specifically, the report concludes that this crisis offers a great opportunity for transforming its uncertainties and costs into a stimulus for maturing an infrastructure of prevention and reduction of vulnerabilities in the Andean economies.
Introduction
Enormous uncertainties currently exist in regard to the extent and repercussions of the international food price crisis. Recent Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates speak of over 850 million people suffering hunger whose expectations of overcoming this situation have been set back by increases in the prices of basic foods. In addition, there are many other households that could join the hungry as a result of higher food prices. Even though the recent high-level summit held in early 2008 in Rome and sponsored by FAO increased the commitment of rich nations and international donors to contribute a total of US$18 billion, this amount is still very much below that organization's estimates of the US$30 billion annual cost of eliminating hunger.
In this context, this document attempts to analyze the causes, effects and policy alternatives in Latin America and the Caribbean in relation to the international food price crisis.
The study concentrates on understanding the orders of magnitude of the crisis in the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), describing in Section 2 the international crisis through stylized facts and their concretization in the Andean countries.
Section 3 provides a first approach to the repercussions of the crisis on the external and productive sectors, especially agriculture. This section also presents the distributive aspects of the crisis by means of a simple simulation exercise which isolates the direct and short-term effect of the strong but unequal increase in certain food prices on consumers and producers in each country. Section 4 presents and compares the policy options selected in each country to tackle the crisis, grouping them into three blocks of measures: macroeconomic policies, compensatory social policies, and supply-side policies. The document analyzes the potential effectiveness of each policy in each country, using a qualitative analysis of expected impacts on a series of desirable properties of interventions. Section 5 presents the conclusions, underscoring various messages common to the Andean countries irrespective of the repercussions of the crisis, its impacts and the policies adopted.
Current Food Price Crisis in the World and the Andean Countries
There is now a general consensus that food prices have risen due to the coincidence of various causes related to supply and demand on a global scale. These factors are the higher price of energy, especially oil; increased demand (in both quantity and variety) for food by countries such as China and India; restrictions on supply following natural disasters associated with climate change; 2 and diversion of agricultural production, particularly corn, from food to bio-fuels.
There is less consensus, however, on the implications of speculative practices on futures markets in agricultural commodities. The proportion of total production traded on these markets is relatively small, although growing, and part of the transactions on these markets consists of legitimate operations to protect against future risks (IFPRI, 2008a) . Moreover, there does not seem to be a consensus on how long the crisis can be expected to last, mixing factors which a priori seem short term (such as natural disasters) with others seen as structural (such as growing demand in China and India or high energy prices).
Food prices has risen to record levels for the last 50 years, with a strong acceleration in the last two years in the context of an already growing trend of nominal prices coinciding with the change of millennium, as shown in Figure 1 below. In other words, the acceleration of food prices during the last two years has been especially pronounced, following on the upward trend in previous years. The foods especially affected include wheat, corn, rice, soy, sugar and beef.
As important as this general acceleration in nominal prices may be, the situation in real terms is very different. The aggregate level of food prices is now lower than in 1957 in real terms, but as seen in Figure 1 the trend of the last two years is also upward (although more moderately than in nominal terms). It is interesting to note that international food prices are 3.5 times higher than food prices 50 years ago (even though world consumer prices between 1969 and 2007 increased 72 times worldwide-compared to only six times in the United Statesaccording to information from the Monetary Fund); in contrast, in real terms the current price level is only slightly more than that of 50 years ago.
Although the price increase in the last two years is comparable in nominal terms with the energy crisis of 1973, in real terms that event was much more abrupt than the current crisis.
Although the data are not presented here, the events of 2008 confirm that these conclusions are also valid for the foods mentioned above, except wheat, whose current nominal rise exceeds even 1973. These figures also indicate that major energy and food price crises go hand in hand. This phenomenon makes the case of the Andean countries especially interesting since they are net producers and exporters of oil and energy, which places them in an initially advantageous 2 In the Andean region alone there have been ten episodes of flooding and extreme temperatures -in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru -which caused substantial losses of crops in three of these countries. According to FAO, these episodes generate food insecurity in Ecuador and Bolivia.
position for dealing with a food price crisis when compared to other Latin American and Caribbean countries. How solid that position is-and how it varies from country to country-are discussed below. The consequences of this price increase on the general price level are substantial in the Andean region, but there is no homogeneous or general impact. Figure 3 shows different orders of magnitude for the price increase in each Andean country. Part of the explanation is that food represents different weightings in each national basic basket. It is precisely in the countries where food has greater weight in the basic basket-Bolivia and Peru-where inflation increased most rapidly (49.1 percent and 47.5 percent, respectively). The comparable figure was 25.1 percent in Ecuador, 25.6 percent in Venezuela and 29.5 percent in Colombia. 3 However, the change in the general price index cannot be attributed exclusively to the trend in food prices.
Structural and short-term factors in each country, as well as the menu of different types of policies and interventions, explain another part of the inflation increase in each country. In countries such as Bolivia and Peru (and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador), where the rise in food prices was greater, the range of change of the year-on-year rate of prices was also wider. Source: IDB calculations based on data from national statistical agencies and central banks.
A First Approach to the Impacts of the Food Price Crisis on the Andean Countries
This section presents a first approach to the macroeconomic and distributive impacts of the food price crisis in the Andean region. Two sets of simulations were made which estimate the impact on the balance of trade and poverty levels in each country. Table 1 summarizes the methodology used, reporting the assumptions, transmission mechanisms, main results obtained from the simulations, and the key observations derived. As in any simulation exercise, the accuracy of the results of some of the simplifications should be viewed with caution. Specifically, the simulations capture a first effect, or first round effect, before any reaction, strategy or change in the trend of the agents takes place. However, it is reasonable to assume that in the short term neither agricultural production (subject to foreign trade) nor substitution of food for non-food production is substantial (as will be seen later). Consequently, these impacts can be considered as the maximum and immediate effects of the crisis, rather than the long-term effects, which will be determined by, among other things, by implementation or non-implementation of longer-term policies (see Section 4). (1) There are no changes in the trend of exports or imports, that is, no substitution, specialization or diversification (2) Effects of the international price increase is simulated for six foods (wheat, corn, rice, soy, sugar and beef), and for these six foods and oil jointly between 2006 and March 2008. (3) A perfect pass-through of international prices is assumed with respect to each country's imports and exports.
(1) The effect reported is a first round impact or ceiling before policies or strategies are implemented.
(2) Comparing the same increase in international prices for the same products gives results that are strictly comparable, although the simulated price increase is not strictly that observed in each country.
Distributive simulation
The effect of rising food prices on the rate, gap and severity of total and extreme poverty for each Andean country; and the cost of closing the new poverty gap attributable to the crisis.
(1) There are no changes in household behavior, whether consumers or net producers, or with respect to their patterns of work, accumulation or consumption.
(2) The observed effects of price increases of all foods are estimated as observed in each country between January 2006 and 3) The price increase implies an increase in the cost of the basic food basket which is used to estimate the poverty line which is the reference for calculating the various dimensions of poverty. (4) A net household producer of food is where agricultural income is higher than food spending. (5) The benefit of net food producers is calculated on the assumption that all net household food producers sell all their surplus to the market, and so benefit directly from the price increase.
(1) An estimate is made of a first round effect, ceiling, of increasing prices before any new measure or change in behavior of the agents takes place. (2) There is an effect on consumers and another, of opposite sign, on net food producers, both are income effects because substitution is not permitted between food or between food and non-food. (3) The effect to a certain extent overestimates the real first round effect because not all net food producers sell their surplus to the market. However, the information from the household surveys does not always permit a precise identification of the destination of the surplus.
Source: Authors' compilation based on consultation with the Integration and Trade Division of the Inter-American Development Bank and on Robles et al. (2008) In the first case, the effect of the food price increase on the external accounts will depend on various factors. In particular, the countries that are net food importers will be negatively affected while net exporters will benefit. However, the magnitude of the impact will depend on whether food has a favorable effect on their terms of trade. In this respect, the Andean countries have experienced a growing trend in their terms of trade, because they are net exporters of oil and products, metals and/or minerals, whose prices have increased more than those of food over the last two years. However, the improvement in terms of The simulations confirm these expectations up to a point. In all cases there is a deterioration of the trade balance: net imports exceed net exports after the price increase of the six foods. This impact is fairly moderate, however, representing less than one percentage point of GDP. Not all these foodstuffs have the same importance in the imports and exports of the Andean countries, and some of them are in fact net exporters. This result differs from that produced by a similar exercise for the Central American and Caribbean countries (see Levy, 2008) . Lastly, when including the oil price increase, the trade situation improves substantially in countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela, again assuming that there are no changes in import and export volumes, only in their value. Only in the case of Peru does inclusion of higher oil prices worsen the net effect of the price increase, as shown in Table 2 . In regard to distributive effects, the exercise simulated the effect that a food price income and expenditure survey is available. An increase in food prices represents a reduction in purchasing power, which can also be described as an increase in a country's poverty line.
Individuals will fall below this poverty line (some not poor before the crisis fall below the total poverty line, while others fall below the extreme poverty line). Considering the price increase for the six foods reported in Section 2 (wheat, corn, rice, soy, sugar and beef, and their weighting in each country's basic basket), the poverty line increases by an equivalent percentage. Robles et al. (2008) describe the methodology in more detail. This trend requires measuring a new poverty line based on:
where EPL is the extreme poverty line, π_food is the increase in food prices in each country, and MPL is the moderate poverty line. The value of the basic food basket is changed while the rest of the basket remains constant. It should be clarified that these estimates do not consider the possible additional consequences (or "second round") of compensatory interventions or of individual crisis management strategies. As will be seen below, the nature and design of the policy responses, their scope, duration and costs will determine how much of the initial distributive effect is reversed (or expanded). The effects of some of these individual strategies can be especially negative if they lead to a reduction in the quantity and quality of food consumption (child malnutrition and its future effects); an increase in the labor supply of women and children (problems with organization of childcare, or child labor, reduction of school attendance); reduction and postponement of needed medical treatment (illness, mortality); and sale of productive goods (reduction of capacity to generate income). These longer-term life-cycle and even intergenerational impacts are not included in the simulations.
Not surprisingly, the most significant simulated impact on the incidence of poverty takes place where food prices increase most and food consumption represents a higher percentage of household expenditure (see Annex 1). In our simulations, this happens in the case of Bolivia.
The increase in extreme poverty (not shown here) in the four countries is higher than the estimated increase in terms of total poverty. Two inferences can be drawn from this finding.
First, a considerable proportion of households that were already poor prior to the food price increase enter the ranks of the extremely poor. Second, these households outnumber the initially non-poor households that became poor after the food price increase. Source: IDB staff based on national income and expenditure surveys.
Our simulations also confirm (see Figure 5 ) that the impact of the increase in national prices worsens the gap and severity of poverty in each country, with both increasing more in countries where the impact of the price increase is greater. In other words, the increase in total and extreme poverty is accompanied by the fact that households which fall below these lines are, on average, now further away from overcoming this situation than poor households were before the crisis.
How much further? The following simulations measure the cost of reversing the worsening of the total poverty gap in each country after the food price increase. As Figure 6 shows, this cost fluctuates between 0.14 percent of total household income in Peru (the country with the lowest relative food price increase) and 2 percent of total household income in Bolivia (the country with the highest increase in relative food prices). These direct increases in poverty are higher in rural areas in the case of Colombia and Peru, very similar in urban and rural areas in Ecuador, and notably higher in urban areas in Bolivia (see Figure 7 ). In the latter country, although average household food spending as a percentage of total household is higher in rural than in urban areas, less than 10 percent of urban households produce food, so the great majority are net buyers of foods whose prices have risen sharply. In contrast, the great majority of poor rural households (between 60 and 80 percent) are net food producers, so the food price rises in the markets affect a lower proportion of their consumption (see Annex 1). For the rest of the countries, whether it is the urban or rural areas which receive a greater impact on poverty is determined by the percentage of food expenditure of urban and rural households "close" to their respective poverty lines. If food expenditure represents a higher percentage of total expenditure among urban households close to the urban poverty line than in rural households in a similar situation, higher prices can be expected to have more impact in urban areas. This is the case in
Colombia, but the opposite occurs in Ecuador. As shown in Figure 8 , the effect of loss of purchasing power is greater than the effect of higher income, as the price increase results in a loss for the majority of net food consumer households and the benefits for net food producers reach only a minority of households. 
Policies to Confront the Food Price Crisis in the Andean Region
The current food price crisis has so far led to increasing recognition by governments, donors and societies in general of the importance of investing in agriculture; the need to increase food production and provide assistance to small-scale producers to increase their productivity; and the This consensus, however, left out other important points on which there is less clarity or general commitment (IFPRI, 2008b) . These include elimination of trade barriers, especially those that restrict exports; limitations on the use of grains, and oil and fat products for production of biofuels; 6 and the way in which policies will be coordinated and implemented.
Part of this lack of clarity is explained by the interests of various power groups in each country, and by limitations on existing diagnoses. Analytically at least, obtaining consensus on the measures that mitigate or prevent these crises in the future requires not only a determination of the causes of the food price crisis, but also and above all a determination of the importance of each of these causes and their interrelations. The analyses made to date by FAO, the InterAmerican Bank, World Bank, Monetary Fund, and IFPRI, among others, agree on various causes. Demand factors include higher energy prices, increase in subsidized production of biofuels, population and income growth, and urbanization, while supply factors include restrictions on land and water use, lack of investment in rural infrastructure and agricultural innovation, lack of access to agricultural inputs, and natural disasters. None of these analyses, however, discuss the relative importance of these factors or provide a detailed account of their
interrelations. As a result, there is no clear consensus on what to do, how to do it or who should
do what at international level. So it is not surprising that, at the country level, this lack of clarity has resulted in a variety of policies and interventions. In the Andean case, these responses display some similarities but also, more importantly, a series of differences that do not necessarily correspond to differences in the impact of the crisis. Table 3 All the Andean countries have nutrition programs in the schools and/or emergency labor programs. However, there are no reports that these have been intensified or expanded to confront the food price crisis. Moreover, these programs lack mechanisms to reverse potential effects, such as deterioration of nutrition among children who leave school to join the agricultural labor force (higher opportunity cost among poor food producing households), or to compensate for changes in demand for employment produced by relative price changes (between levels of specialization or geographical areas, for example).
With respect to supply-side policies, the Andean countries have implemented various policies to soften the impact of food price increases. In Bolivia, the government authorized until
May of 2008 the duty-free import of key foodstuffs, such as rice, wheat, wheat-derived products, corn, soy oil, and meat. In addition, exports of cereals and meat products were prohibited. In
Ecuador, the government increased the wheat flour subsidy, introduced in October 2008, from US$10 to US$14.3 per 50 kilos. Duties on wheat and wheat flour imports were eliminated, and the price of bread was fixed. In Peru, the government eliminated duties on imports of basic foodstuffs, 8 reduced the selective fuel tax, and set up a program to distribute food to the poorest sectors. In addition, the Peruvian government is currently evaluating the possibility of implementing a food stabilization fund. In Colombia and Venezuela no specific measures have been taken to deal with the food price crisis, although Venezuela has donated US$100 million to other countries in the region to contribute to their food security. Source: Authors' compilation.
An obvious question is how effective have these policies or interventions been in mitigating the effects of the crisis. This can be answered by analyzing the predictable consequences of the interventions. For example, in the case of compensatory policies, Levy (2008) suggests that CCTs are preferable to non-targeted subsidies in the context of a food price crisis because they (i) directly increase the purchasing power of the poor; (ii) allow households to adapt to relative price changes; (iii) do not reduce the income of poor food sellers; (iv) diversify diet and prevent a decrease in food spending; and (v) limit the extent of the support because these policies have clear exit strategies and are clearly presented as such.
9
Another more systematic way of comparing the interventions is to analyze their consequences for a series of dimensions of special interest, as suggested by Manzano and Stein (2008) and Malarín (2008) . 10 The dimensions or criteria analyzed in these two works relate to the degree of targeting and scope of the measures (coverage), final cost (cost), degree of distortion (efficiency) and reversibility (political economy). Although the comparison does not apply a quantitative method which makes it possible to estimate a precise order of magnitude in each of these dimensions, the comparison shown in Table 4 at least permits a detailed physiognomy of the potential effects of the interventions implemented in relation to social compensation and supply-side policies:
9 An example of implementation of these policies is the Mexican government's announcement of implementation of a 120-peso bond (approximately US$12) for beneficiary families of certain social programs (mainly the Oportunidades conditional transfer program). The bond will last seven months and be an additional benefit not integrated with any of the current benefits from other programs. The bond will be implemented from July 2008 and has been clearly "marketed" as an entirely temporary response part of a permanent support strategy for the most vulnerable. 10 Similar discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of different policies can be found in World Bank (2008). Based on this review of the physiognomy of interventions and their effects in each country, it is possible to characterize the package of interventions adopted. To do this we consider how closely the measures taken approximate a package of interventions that may be considered "desirable," that is: (i) they have broad or targeted coverage of the poorest sectors;
(ii) they have a low or even positive fiscal cost; (iii) they have low levels of distortion or generate positive incentives; and (iv) they are easily reversible after completing their mission. On the other hand, a set of interventions is "undesirable" to the extent that it has the opposite effects.
There is also the possibility that the same package could contain measures with both desirable and undesirable characteristics. Table 5 below shows this characterization of the packages of measures country by country. An important point here is that not necessarily all these actions were generated in direct response to the food price crisis, since some were planned previously. In any event, the table clearly shows that each country combines a mix of policies in which expected positive impacts predominate and others where the opposite is expected. The predominant effect of other policies, such as the establishment or use of public trading companies, will depend on their design, mandate and implementation. Another way of approaching the effectiveness of interventions in relation to the food price crisis examines the sequence and implementation of the proposed policy mix. IFPRI (2008a) emphasizes the need to separate short-term measures, which they term an "emergency package," from long-term measures, or packages of long-term measures. Explicitly, there is recognition that different actors must assume different responsibilities, and that the scope of certain measures is necessarily national while others measures have to be international and require a degree of international inter-institutional coordination. Even though IFPRI (2008a) does not discuss the costs of these policies or their feasibility (questions of political economy which facilitate or impede their execution), it is interesting to ask how the current interventions of the Andean countries perform in relation to these packages of short and long-term measures. Source: Authors' compilation and IFPRI (2008a) . Notes: (*) Short-term measures to create incentives for agricultural growth through access to seeds, fertilizers, credit for small producers, carefully subsidizing and targeting these inputs, along with electricity and water, and development of market access programs for subsistence producers. (**) Includes investments in infrastructure, services, research, technology, which go not only to the agricultural level but more collectively cover productive chains, involving the private sector in areas such as food processing and sale, for example.
Conclusions
It is extremely difficult to predict when a crisis will end while it is still taking place. The current food price crisis is no exception. Even though there is consensus on what factors are causing the crisis, there is less agreement on how to confront it: specifically, how to obtain a balance of short-and long-term interventions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how to achieve in practice another balance between cautious macroeconomic measures, effective compensatory social policies, and a lasting supply-side stimulus without disastrous distortions. The data reviewed and the analysis of simulations in this work suggest that in the Andean countries the magnitude of the crisis and the trade and distributive effect are very significant, although less than in Central America and the Caribbean. As a result, "patchwork" policies will result in costly and poorly effective interventions. In this context, considering a temporary crisis as a permanent shock could be a less costly error than considering a structural change as transitory. To the extent that the crisis offers an opportunity for continuing the structural reforms needed to improve agricultural productivity, and guaranteeing timely and adequate compensation for the most vulnerable, the most correct strategic response in a period of high uncertainty could be to treat this or any other emerging crisis as "permanent." The most obvious illustration of this proposition is the process of strengthening social programs around solid CCTs. In the context of the food price crisis, improvements can be made to these programs such as: extending them to areas or beneficiaries who do not currently receive benefits (whether they become eligible because of the crisis or because they were eligible before the crisis but did not enjoy the benefits); index benefits to the food price increase or to the total loss of purchasing power (because of inflation of food and other goods and services); establish automatic alarm formulas (on certain thresholds in key indicators which are easy to track). How complicated or simple it is to implement these responses (for example, distinguishing between producer households and net food consumers) and how effectively the government can transmit the temporary nature of the intervention (that is, it is not a new social entitlement) will determine the effectiveness of this intervention.
Curiously, no country seems to have adopted a complete set of desirable policies with respect to broad coverage and/or targeting of the most vulnerable; low fiscal cost; high effectiveness and reversibility if necessary. However, some countries seem to have adopted one or more responses aimed at achieving some of these criteria, but these responses are mixed with others which could have undesirable effects such as increased trade restrictions or general price subsidies. The effect of other strategies, such as establishment of state agencies for promotion of agricultural production, is difficult to predict because they are not known in great detail.
Similarly, the effect of the strategies of Colombia and Venezuela is not clear, as these countries have not taken direct measures against the crisis. A fundamental point here has to do with the fact that even the countries that seem to have taken (or not taken) measures against the crisis had been planning or initiating these reforms prior to the crisis. This means that, in contrast to the previous reflection, it is not easy to use major long-term interventions to respond to possible short-term changes. It also means that the design of these interventions must introduce certain elements of flexibility (for example, the possibility of emergency indexing of a benefit) and/or consider different contexts to be tackled by the intervention over time. No intervention can be totally guaranteed against all eventualities, but different scenarios need to be considered for intervention in the future.
In contrast, and this is easier to predict, short-term or indiscriminate measures will result in expensive, unsustainable and ineffective exercises. Exclusively compensatory social measures will only address one dimension of the problem, but not its productive or macroeconomic side. A combination of responsible and cautious macro-policies, on the one hand, and measures that effectively support agricultural diversification and competitiveness (needed a long time before this crisis), on the other hand, must accompany efforts to expand a social protection system that is really effective in dealing with this and future crises. To do this, the crisis should be treated as an opportunity that requires continuing implementation of wide-ranging social and productive reforms, rather than as a passing shock which requires exclusively short-term measures. These actions involve in turn recognition beyond mere words that the responsibility for mitigating the crisis is not exclusive to each individual country, but must also involve the international community as a whole, above all in relation to a trade policy which produces distortions and asymmetries favorable to the large producing countries.
